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Six years ago, immediately after the democratic movement 
was repressed in China, almost all Chinese liberal intellectuals 
and Western observers predicted that, without "political re-
form," "economic reform" would fail in China. Despite their 
warnings, tens of billions of dollars have continued to pour into 
China. Now it is obvious that the capitalists themselves had a 
better estimate of Chinese reality than their theoreticians. In 
fact, judging from subsequent events, it could be said that the 
army's success in breaking up the Tiananmen demonstration 
and attacking its working-class supporters helped pave the way 
for further capitalist development. 
Reform, 1989 Events, and Capitalism 
While the Chinese socialist revolution ultimately failed 
to create a genuine socialist society, China after 1949 could 
no longer be the country it had been. The Chinese People's 
Republic was the product of a socialist revolution and bore 
its mark. 
The Chinese working class enjoyed wide-ranging social 
rights, such as the right to work (the "iron rice bowl"), the right 
Li Minqistudied economics at Beijing University from 1987 to 1990 and participated 
in the 1989 democrutic movement. Mter the Tiananmen massacre, he became disillusioned 
with the liberal intelligentsia who led the democratic movement and grudually turned to a 
Marxist revolutionary perspective. He was arrested for making an antigovernment speech 
in 1990 and was sentenced to a two-year prison term. He currently studies economics at the 
University of Delaware. The author wishes to thank Thomas Lutze for his advice. 
'-
2 MONTHLY REVIEW / JANUARY 1996 
to almost free housing, and the right to free health care-
rights that are unimaginable for workers in a capitalist 
society. 
In a capitalist society, workers participate in production 
because they are forced to_. Capitalist production relies upon 
a range of mechanisms of coercion. For example, the unem-
ployment mechanism plays an indispensable role in maintain-
ing the "efficiency" ofa capitalist economy; and social welfare 
must be restrained to a "rational" limit, otherwise the workers 
will be "lazy." 
The iron rice bowl and other social rights that the work-
ing class enjoyed in revolutionary China were not mere mate-
rial benefits, but had an important impact on relations of 
production. These social rights implied a degree of workers' 
control of the process of production, a right of much greater 
importance than legally formal "civil rights" in the real con-
tent of the lives of most people. For Marxists, the iron rice 
bowl cannot itself result in "inefficiency." In fact, the produc-
tive potential of working people will be fully released only 
when they have genuine control of the process of production. 
Indeed, in the Maoist era, the Chinese economic record was 
quite respectable: 
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It can be seen that China's economic growth rate was not 
only higher than that of the developed countries, but was also 
relatively high compared to the developing countries. It is not 
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difficult to establish that China also had a higher dynamic 
efficiency (contradicting the widely accepted idea that 
China's high economic growth rate was achieved at the cost 
of low efficiency), in terms of higher growth rate of labor 
productivity. 
This achievemen t was possible as long as China remained 
a revolutionary country. But with the failure of the Cultural 
Revolution (which lost much of its vigor after 1969), the 
furthest development of the Chinese revolution was reached. 
The ruling class began to strengthen its position. But as the 
working class continued to enjoy the iron rice bowl, the ruling 
class's ability to extract surplus value was restricted. This 
dilemma, from the ruling class's poin t of view, could be solved 
only by introducing the capitalist economic mechanism, that 
is ultimately by breaking the iron rice bowl. The struggle over 
the iron rice bowl is at the center of the so-called "economic 
reform." The controversy between market and planning was 
the academic expression of this real controversy. The latter, 
of course, took place not on paper but in the real battle field 
of material forces. These battles reached one climax in the 
1989 events. 
In 1989, the Chinese working class, like its Eastern Euro-
pean counterparts, failed to make itself into an independent 
self-conscious political force. To a large extent, they were 
mobilized by liberal intellectuals around a program of politi-
cal liberalization which denied rather than revealed their 
independen t class in terest. The failure of the Chinese working 
class to emerge as an independent self-conscious political 
force, however, did not mean (as it did in Eastern Europe) 
that it would not constitute an immediate and real threat to 
capitalist development. This real threat was reflected in the 
political controversy among the liberal intelligentsia im-
mediately before the 1989 events. 
In that controversy, a significant number of Chinese 
liberal intellectuals favored "new authoritarianism." Propo-
nents of this position argued that the process of moderniza-
tion might well bring about substantial social chaos and 
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turbulence, which would threaten to destroy the moderniza-
tion project itself. For this reason, the political system most 
conducive to modernization was not democracy, but some 
kind of authoritarianism with flexible political leadership, 
able to proceed by coercive measures. To translate, capitalist 
development would inevitably meet with the opposition and 
resistance of working people, an opposition that in turn had 
to be met with political repression, otherwise capitalist devel-
opment could only fail. 
In fact, the self-proclaimed "democrats" agreed that their 
struggle for democratic rights should not disrupt the social 
order, which was set on the path to capitalism. At the last 
minute, faced with severe government repression, proposals 
for an open call for a popular uprising were dismissed. 
Democracywas repressed, but capitalism was saved. Mter 
an initial tension between the ruling class and the intellectu-
v als, the two sides quickly reached a new social contract. The 
ruling class conceded to the intellectuals some social-eco-
nomic privileges, promising a technocracy in which intellec-
tuals could participate more fully in political 
decision-making. l 
The intelligentsia, in return, promised to support the 
"reform," and the struggle against the iron rice bowl. As a 
result, the political influence ofthe liberal opposition (whose 
social base was limited to the intelligentsia) quickly declined. 
Without political leadership, it is unlikely that the resent-
ments of the working class can erupt into a national rebellion. 
China enjoys political stability, providing a favorable environ-
ment for investment. Capitalist accumulation has proceeded 
apace. The Chinese economic growth rates for the last three 
years were 12.7 percent (1992),13.4 percent (1993), and 11.8 
percent (1994). In fact, China's economic boom has out-
stripped the rest of the world. 
Iron Rice Bowl and Chinese Capitalism 
The statistics of economic growth, however, do not tell 
us the qualitative characteristics of Chinese capitalism, nor 
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determine the long-term pattern of Chinese capitalist devel-
opment. 
, The Chinese working class has suffered a political defeat, 
but the "problem" of the iron rice bowl has as yet not been 
completely solved. In 1992, the ruling class launched a new 
wave of "reform," trying to break the iron rice bowl once and 
for all. It met with strong resistance from the working class. In 
some cases workers resorted to violence, killing managers and 
directors. The ruling class, afraid of further unexpected de-
velopmen ts, retreated. 
Chinese capitalism has so far been able to afford the 
"luxury" of maintaining the state-owned enterprises. 2 After 
the agricultural reform, peasants were released to be free 
labor. In the early 1980s, China had a "surplus" labor force of 
over 100 million in the countryside. Such a large reserve army 
of labor allowed China to develop capitalism, by developing 
"rural enterprises" and private enterprises, and by introduc-
ing foreign capital. Without this "surplus" labor, the Chinese 
ruling class would have had to wage an immediate struggle 
against the working class-by no means an easy task-before 
proceeding down the road of capitalist development. It is this 
distinct set of class relations (in part reflecting the relatively 
backward development of productive forces in China) that 
allows Chinese capitalism to prosper rather than be paralyzed 
as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
After sixteen years of capitalist development, however, 
the state-owned sector still plays a central and indispensable 
role in the Chinese economy. According to Zhang Youcai, a 
vice-minister of the Ministry of Finance: 
State-owned enterprises, especially large and middle-sized enter-
prises, are the major suppliers of energy, transport, important raw 
materials, and technological equipment. In 1993, the total asset 
value of over 80,000 state-owned industrial enterprises accounted 
for 66 percent of the asset value of all enterprises keeping a separate 
account. The contribution of state-owned enterprises to state fi-
nance accounted for 60 percent of state income. Compared to other 
types of enterprises, state-owned enterprises take the lead in main-
stay industries and strategic sectors, and are better technologically 
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equipped. They are also comparatively strong in R&D. In respect to 
labor productivity, state-owned enterprises continue to enjoy an 
incomparable ascendancy over other types of enterprises.3 
As long as the ruling class cannot solve the problem of 
the iron rice bowl in the. state-owned sector where it is still 
established, it cannot "efficiently" exploit a large sector of the 
most productive workers. As a result, the state-owned enter-
prises cannot carry out normal capitalist accumulation. In the 
early 1990s, it was estimated that one-third of the state-owned 
enterprises made explicit losses, while another third did not 
make explicit losses but their depreciation funds were not 
enough for reinvestment. This means that a large sector of the 
state-owned enterprises may not be able to reproduce them-
selves in the long run, let alone carry out normal capitalist 
accumulation. Given the importance of state-owned enter-
prises, this could create a serious obstacle to Chinese capitalist 
accumulation in the future. "Whether Chinese capitalism will 
be able to overcome this obstacle is open to question. 
State, Regionalism, and Dependent Development 
A strong, efficient state is normally indispensable for 
successful capitalist development in modern times, as in South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Each of these countries built 
their economic development upon a highly centralized base, 
with substantial state intervention. This is important not only 
because state coordination plays an important role in improv-
ing macroeconomic efficiency, but also because only with the 
active intervention of the state is it possible for a developing 
country to establish independen t technological developmen t, 
, and to free itself to any degree from the dependence on 
foreign technology and capital goods. 
For this reason, it is necessary to examine the character-
istics of the Chinese state and to see how they have influenced 
the pattern of Chinese capitalist development. Before "re-
form," the state substantially controlled the whole economy. 
In 1978, the state-owned enterprises accounted for 77.6 per-
cent of the gross industrial product, but in 1992 they ac-
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counted for only 48.1 percent. On the other hand, the share 
of the "collective enterprises" (most of which are "rural enter-
prises") rose to 38 percent, and that of private enterprises to 
13.9 percent.4. 
The development of capit!llist and semicapitalist enter-
prises is based on the "surplus" labor in the countryside, labor 
whom we may refer to as China's new proletariat. This new 
proletariat is much less self-conscious, much less militant, 
than the old proletariat of the state-owned enterprises. For 
them, the most elementary civil rights so beloved of the 
"reforming" intellectuals are not secured, not to even men-
tion socialist rights-the iron rice bowl. From the capitalist 
point of view, the economic system based on this kind oflabor 
is "efficient." 
Due to the dynamics of the market mechanism, these 
capitalist and semicapitalist enterprises quickly concentrated 
in a few of China's richest provinces. Their economic interests 
are not necessarily consistent with that of national capitalist 
development. As a result, they need some political authority 
to protect their special interests. The provincial governments 
have more common interests with them than the central 
government and can better satisfY their need for political 
protection. One consequence is that the concentration of 
capitalist and semicapitalist enterprises in a few provinces 
subs tan tially strengthens the posi tion of these provinces vis-a-
vis the central government. 
At the same time, many bureaucratic-comprador compa-
nies have thrived in coastal provinces in the period of "re-
form." These companies have made many members of the 
ruling class millionaires, or even billionaires. As a result, an 
alliance of the provincial governments, capitalist and semi-
capitalist enterprises, and the bureaucratic-comprador com-
panies has emerged, quickly changing the balance of power 
between the central government and the provincial govern-
ments.5 The weakening of the central government can be seen 
from the fact that, excluding state-owned enterprises, the 
share of the expenditure of the central government in GNP 
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dropped from 14.5 percent in 1978 to 7.1 percent in 1992, 
while the share of state investment in total investment 
dropped from 16 percent in 1985 to 4.3 percent in 1992.6 
As a result, the state's ability to coordinate economic 
development has been sllbstantially weakened, impacting 
upon Chinese capitalist development in several ways: 
- Without effective economic planning, capitalist and 
semicapitalist enterprises, and local governments, blindly 
make investments resulting in severe over-capacity in some 
industrial sectors (e.g., idle capacity accounts for 49 percent 
of the total capacity in refrigerators, 26.9 percen tin washing-
machines, and 52.2 percent in air-conditioners. 7) 
- The state now lacks money to make investment in 
infrastructure that is indispensable for any further economic 
development, and has to rely upon foreign capital. 
- Capitalist and semicapitalist enterprises and local govern-
ments tend to concentrate their investments in labor-intensive, 
consumer-goods industries, built upon imported technologies 
and capital goods, rather than developing China's indigenous 
technological ability. And without financial resources, the 
central government can do nothing to better the situation. It 
is reported that R&D expenditure accounts for only 0.5 per-
cent of Chinese GNP, while for developing countries as a 
whole it usually accounts for 1 to 2 percent and for developed 
countries the average is 2.6 percent.8 As a result, China fails 
to develop indigenous technological ability. Chinese eco-
nomic development becomes more and more dependent on 
foreign technologies and imported capital. 
The pattern of dependent development can be 
illustrated in the case of the computer industry: 
China's goal ... is to become a major supplier to the domestic and 
world markets of low-end PCs and peripherals, including printers, 
monitors, and circuit boards. Through mass exports of such prod-
ucts, China will be able to earn foreign exchange to import the 
higher end systems and technology needed to sustain the growth of 
the computer industry. 
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This low-end production is itself dependent on imported 
chips: 
China's integrated circuit ("IC") production ability is extremely low 
and limited to ICs used in consumer goods, such as televisions and 
refrigerators. As a result, China must import almost all the ICs 
needed for computer production. Although China is trying to build 
up its domestic IC production base, international restrictions im-
posed by the Coordination Committee for Multinational Export 
Controls (COCOM) prohibit China from gaining the technology 
needed to produce more complex ICs.9 
Chinese government officials acknowledge that in techno-
logical terms, the Chinese integrated circuits industry has fallen 
fifteen years behind the international level. While it is expected 
that Chinese integrated circuit production will reach 1 billion 
pieces in the year 2000, the domestic demand will then rise to 2 
or 3 billion pieces, leaving 1 or 2 billion pieces to be imported. 
In fact, China has already suffered much from depen-
dent development. When there is trade between China and 
the developed countries, China sells what the developed 
countries can produce only at greater cost, while developed· 
countries sell what China cannot produce at all (advanced 
technologies and capital goods), for which China has to pay 
almost any price the developed countries charge. For several 
reasons, dependent development puts the long run sustainabil-
ity of Chinese capitalist development into question. Here we will 
mention only the most basic points arising from the terms on 
which Chinese capitalism participates in the world market. 
First, China can produce some products more cheaply 
than the developed countries only because it can exploit" 
much cheaper labor. But in the long run, with technological 
progress, the labor cost will account for a smaller and smaller 
share in the total production cost. This is true even for 
today's labor-intensive industry. As a result, it will be in-
creasingly difficult for China to produce more cheaply than 
the developed countries. 
Second, if international economic conditions turn un-
favorable for China (in the long run this will inevitably 
10 MONTHLY REVIEW / JANUARY 1996 
happen), with less export income, China will not be able to 
pay for the import of technology and capital goods, which 
China is not able to produce itself; as a result, China will have 
to borrow heavily from the international capital market 
(China's foreign debt aln;ady reached $100 billion in 1994), 
and probably enter into a vicious cycle of debt dependency 
along with the likelihood of economic decline. 
New Trends in the Class Struggle 
In fact, Chinese "reform" consists of two interrelated but 
separate parts, the urban "reform" and the rural "reform." 
The rural "reform" initially appeared to be rather popular. It 
gave the ruling class an important political-social base in the 
early 1980s. It also explained why the peasants-the m~ority 
of the Chinese people-took a neutral position at a critical 
time in 1989. The rural "reform," however, is nothing more 
than the restoration of petty peasant economy, which is both 
economically and socially subject to the modern urban sector. 
Therefore, the final significance of the rural "reform" does 
not depend on itself but on the nature of the urban "reform." 
After 1984, the initial agricultural "miracle" disappeared. 
While the Chinese new urban capitalist economy grew at the 
higpest rate in the world, the peasants' living standard virtu-
ally stagnated. Official propaganda celebrates that thanks to 
reform, peasants are now liberated from their traditional 
dependence on land. Millions of peasants find, however, that 
they are liberated simply to be unemployed. vVhile it is re-
ported that in the past fifteen years, rural enterprises had 
absorbed 120 million "surplus" workers, the total surplus now 
stands at 170 million. This large reserve army oflabor plays a 
crucial role in keeping the labor force cheap and docile, 
which is the cornerstone of Chinese capitalist prosperity. 
This urban/rural contradiction is further intensified by 
the spatial pattern of Chinese capitalist accumulation. With 
the central government weakened, local governments now 
play an important role in capitalist accumulation. Just as 
capitalists compete with one another, Chinese local govern-
I 
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ments compete. What makes it different from capitalist com-
petition is that the local governments can raise investment 
funds by imposing taxes on the peasants. Consequently com-
petition takes the form of an increasing pressure on the 
peasants which has, in some cases, driven peasants into out-
right rebellion. -
On the other hand, the state-owned industries and the 
iron rice bowl are still a major barrier to Chinese capitalist 
accumulation. The ruling class is planning a new offensive 
against the working class. It is forecast that from 1995 to 2000 
urban unemployment will increase from 4.8 million to 21 
million. II This will open a new round of class struggle in 
China. 
Liberal intellectuals, although to a large extent now in 
disrepute, are trying to take advantage of this situation. Yuan 
Hongbing, who taught at Beijing University and holds a phil-
osophical theory of "hero worship," joined with some other 
intellectuals and graduate students and tried to establish a 
so-called "Union for the Protection of Workers' Rights." Their 
basic idea was to develop some kind of "independent" trade 
union movement that would limit itself to demands for bour-
geois civil rights and reformist measures, considered indis-
pensable for a "heal thy" market economy. But they wen t about 
their work in a completely unrealistic fashion. They went to 
the government, informing the officials that they had an 
organization for workers' rights, and asked the government to 
grant it legal status. Of course, they were arrested at once. 
These liberal intellectuals, like those of 1989, insisted on 
the principle of "legality," and this is not only because they are 
unable to grasp the real social situation. For these intellectuals, 
"legality" is more than a means of struggle. Behind the principle 
of "legality" is the ideology of the "rule oflaw," which assumes 
civil rights divorced from social and economic rights, and 
which not only implies a formal "freedom" but at the same 
time "social stability." A struggle restricted by the principle of 
"legality" is controllable. By reducing working people's struggle 
to nothing but bourgeois legal process, it rules out working 
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people's spontaneity and initiative, and subjects them to the 
elite who know and manipulate the law and the legal process. 
But most liberal intellectuals do not want in any fashion 
to address the question of class struggle. Recently a dozen 
"dissidents" sent an antico.rruption suggestion to the People's 
Congress. This was an effort by liberal intellectuals to appeal 
to ordinary people. These same types used to appeal to people 
by asking for deeper and faster reform in the 1980s. Now the 
old appeal does not work. In the suggestion it was said that 
the solution to corruption layin the separation of government 
powers, independence of the judiciary, and a multiparty system. 
It is not my purpose here to deal with the cliches of 
bourgeois ideology, but in this instance its function is nakedly 
exposed. When Chinese working people are faced with a 
desperate fight for the preservation of what is left of their 
revolutionary heritage, suddenly liberal intellectuals declare 
that corruption is the biggest problem in China. By doing this, 
the liberal intellectuals, who regard themselves as the only 
political alternative to the "communist regime" are in effect 
ruling out class struggle from the political agenda. 
The failure of the democratic movement in 1989 has 
proved that the Chinese liberal intellectuals are unqualified 
for the leadership of the Chinese democratic movement. By 
following them, Chinese working people can achieve only 
their own expropriation. The Chinese working people must 
free themselves from the ideological domination of both the 
ruling class and the liberal intelligentsia, and make of them-
selves a really independent political force, i.e., a socialist 
revolutionary force. In this sense, the fate of Chinese democ-
racy is the same as the fate of Chinese socialism. 
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